University of the Pacific

Scholarly Commons
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship

2014

Corrections and Sentencing Reform: The Obstacle Posed by
Dehumanization
J. Clark Kelso
Pacific McGeorge School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
J. Clark Kelso, Corrections and Sentencing Reform: The Obstacle Posed by Dehumanization, 46
McGeorge L. Rev. 897 (2014).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship at
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

Corrections and Sentencing Reform: The Obstacle Posed by
Dehumanization
J. Clark Kelso*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 897
II. DEHUMANIZATION ACCORDING TO THE PSYCHOLOGISTS ............................ 900
III. THE ROLE OF DEHUMANIZATION IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE ........................................................................................... 901
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 906
I. INTRODUCTION
I have served now for seven years as the court-appointed Receiver
responsible for medical care in California’s state prison system. Prior to my
appointment as Receiver in 2008, I had no substantial contact with the day-to-day
operations of any prison or jail system. So I came to the job largely free of
preconceptions about what I would discover. That’s a nice way of saying that I
had no real clue what I was getting myself into. Now, after seven years, I think I
may have had enough experience with the challenge of reforming corrections and
sentencing policy to make a useful observation or two.
The major part of my job as Receiver has been to identify and then take the
steps that had to be taken to improve the quality of care available in the prisons
and to ensure open access to that care. What I quickly discovered right after my
appointment was that the steps to be taken were mostly obvious ones and were
steps that would have been perfectly obvious to anyone with experience in
1
managing any large healthcare organization. Knowing what to do was not really
the challenge.
But this realization—that the “what” was obvious—left me wondering why,
if the solutions were so obvious, the State of California, along with quite a few
other state and local governments around the country, had failed for so long to

* Associate Dean for Strategic Initiatives and Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law. The views expressed in this article are entirely my own and do not constitute any type of official
statement in my capacity as Receiver in charge of medical care within the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation.
1 . J. CLARK KELSO, ACHIEVING A CONSTITUTIONAL LEVEL OF MEDICAL CARE IN CALIFORNIA’S
PRISONS: THE FEDERAL RECEIVER’S TURNAROUND PLAN OF ACTION iii (June 6, 2008), available at
http://www.cphcs.ca.gov/docs/court/plata/2008-06-08_Receivers_Turnaround_Plan_of_Action.pdf (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review). The United States District Court approved the Receiver’s Turnaround Plan of
Action on June 16, 2008. See id.
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implement those solutions to avoid getting sued or to get out of a successful
lawsuit. Why has prison healthcare been such a problem in California and around
the country for the last thirty-five years?
One answer given by some is to blame the messenger, in this instance, the
federal courts that have been applying the United States Supreme Court’s 1976
holding in Estelle v. Gamble that the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishment clause requires prisons and jails to provide adequate health care to
2
inmates. According to these critics, including many in Congress who supported
3
passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), it’s not that health
care in prisons is really unconstitutional, it’s just that federal judges—very often
referred to by these critics as “liberal federal judges”—get carried away and hold
4
prisons and jails to unreasonably high standards. The passage of the PLRA may
have slowed down some of the court action a little bit, as Professor Landsberg
5
explained, but even under the PLRA’s standards for injunctive relief, prisons and
jails around the country still find themselves on the losing side of federal
6
lawsuits, the State of Arizona being one of the most recent losers. As for the
charge that this is just a liberal judicial cause, the decision authored by Justice
7
Anthony Kennedy in Brown v. Plata gives the lie to that simplistic reasoning.
Not all “conservative” judges are oblivious to the shortcomings of prisons in
8
providing basic healthcare.
Another explanation is that state political leaders—those who control budgets
and policy—have no reason to pay attention to this issue in a meaningful way
9
because there is no political benefit. Felons can’t vote as a matter of law, and
voting constituents not only don’t care about the issue, a lot of them are actively
10
hostile to providing health care to prisoners. The question I get asked most
frequently by ordinary people is why we have to spend any money on prisoner
health care when the public’s own health care needs are not being met. Passage
of the Affordable Care Act has made it a little easier to respond to that question,
11
but the public’s sentiment is clearly not in favor of prison healthcare. In fact, in
a public meeting down in Ventura County a few years ago, when members of my

2. 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
3. Pub. L. 104–134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–66 (1996).
4. See Michele Westhoff, An Examination of Prisoners’ Constitutional Right to Healthcare: Theory and
Practice, 20 HEALTH LAW. 1, 5–7 (2008) (noting the deficiencies in prison healthcare).
5. Brian K. Landsberg, Does Prison Reform Bring Sentencing Reform?: The Congress, the Courts, and
the Structural Injunction, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. -- (2014).
6. See Graves v. Arpaio, No. CV-77-00479-PHX-NVW, 2014 WL 4898717, at *37–39 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30,
2014) (denying a motion to terminate injunctive relief), as amended by 2014 WL 6983316 (D. Ariz. Dec. 10,
2014).
7. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
8. See id. at 1963 (discussing the deficiencies of California prison healthcare).
9. CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 4.
10. See Westhoff, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing Americans’ views toward prison healthcare).
11. See id.
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staff, in an effort to communicate how bad conditions were in prison, indicated
that the average age of death in prison was fifty-six years old, there was wild
applause. Working to improve or maintain the quality of health care in prisons
does not produce votes for politicians.
Yet another explanation for state and local failure to act is that the
administrators and bureaucrats who run prisons and jails just aren’t up to the task.
In deciding to appoint a receiver in California, one of Judge Henderson’s
concerns was that there was a pattern of learned helplessness that rendered
12
correctional administrators and bureaucrats simply unable to do the right thing.
Finally, there are some who blame custody officers and the custody mindset
as the primary obstacle to the delivery of adequate healthcare. We heard Barry
Krisberg talk this morning about the importance of that mindset change in
13
reforming the Department of Juvenile Justice.
There is some truth to each of these explanations. But as I have reflected on
this question for the last seven years—why has it been so hard to provide
adequate care—I think that each of these explanations identifies only the most
visible symptoms of a much deeper challenge that affects not just prison
healthcare, but nearly all aspects of corrections operations as well as attitudes
towards sentencing policies. What we have been facing is a widespread and
14
largely unchallenged dehumanization of all criminals and inmates. It is that
dehumanization that lies at the heart of many of the problems in modern
sentencing and corrections systems:
$ Dehumanization of criminals and inmates makes it easier to impose
extremely long and disproportionate sentences;
$ Dehumanization makes it easier for legislators and governors to
underfund and neglect corrections;
$ Dehumanization makes it easier for corrections leaders to establish
draconian punishment policies, such as indeterminate solitary
confinement, and apply those policies broadly to inmates where
solitary confinement really doesn’t advance any legitimate goals;
$ Dehumanization makes it easier for custody officers to employ
excessive force; and

12. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH, 2005 WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005).
13. Barry Krisberg, Reforming the Division of Juvenile Justice: Lessons Learned, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV.
773 (2014).
14. Milica Vasiljevic & G. Tendayi Viki, Dehumanization,Moral Disengagement, and Public Attitudes to
Crime and Punishment, in HUMANNESS AND DEHUMANIZATION 129, 129 (Paul G. Bain, Jeroen Vaes &
Jacques-Philippe Leyens, eds., 2014).
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$ Dehumanization causes even healthcare professionals who work in the
prisons to treat their patients at arm’s length and with fear and
distrust.
I believe that if we could substantially rid ourselves of the unnecessary
dehumanization of criminals and inmates, many of the problems we have seen
over the last thirty years in sentencing policy and corrections operations would be
much more readily solvable.
Now that’s a somewhat interesting thesis and prediction, but where is the
academic or empirical support for it? Why should this thesis be taken seriously?
The good news for me is that there is beginning to be at least some
preliminary scholarly explorations of the topic of dehumanization and sentencing
and corrections reform. I’d like to turn to some of that research now.
II. DEHUMANIZATION ACCORDING TO THE PSYCHOLOGISTS
Researchers in the field of psychology have recently been turning their
attention to the systematic study of the impacts of dehumanization of criminals
15
and inmates. This research has generally identified two very different types of
dehumanization. The first is described as mechanistic dehumanization, and the
16
second is described as animalistic dehumanization.
Mechanistic dehumanization refers to words, attitudes, and behaviors that
result in denying to a person attributes of interpersonal warmth, cognitive
17
flexibility, and emotionality. When stripped of these attributes, a person is
18
perceived as being inflexible, cold, unemotional, rigid, and machine-like.
Animalistic dehumanization refers to words, attitudes, and behaviors that
result in denying to a person those unique attributes that differentiate humans
from animals—attributes such as use of higher order language and moral
19
sensibility. Stripped of those attributes, a person can be likened to an animal,
and in the case of dehumanization of criminals and inmates, most frequently as a
20
wild, violent, dangerous, predatory animal. Although there may be some
examples of the mechanistic dehumanization of convicts and criminals, it is
much more common to see language and to observe practices that fall into the
21
animalistic category.
15. See id. at 131.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. (“Animalistic dehumanization refers to the denial of attributes that are uniquely human (e.g.,
civility, refinement, higher cognition, and moral sensibility).”).
20. Id. at 131, 140.
21. See id. at 138 (attaching animalistic dehumanization to crimes “considered coarse, unrefined,
immature, irrational, and lacking in civility, such as rape and murder” and mechanistic dehumanization to
white-collar crimes).
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The most immediate consequence of animalistic dehumanization is to rob
inmates of their status as moral beings worthy of being treated with the same
dignity and respect that is accorded to all other people. The tag of convict or
inmate is used to strip away one’s personhood. Bereft of the moral entitlement to
be treated as a human being, convicts and inmates are easy prey for mistreatment
22
and abuse. Indeed, it is not even seen as mistreatment or abuse precisely
because of the moral devaluation of the convict’s humanity.
The research also suggests that the language associated with animalistic
dehumanization of criminals has an impact on public opinions regarding
punishment and rehabilitation, leading to excessively long punishments and a
23
belief that offenders cannot be rehabilitated.
There is a great deal more empirical work to be done on this topic, both to
repeat and validate the early research results and to explore additional questions.
One important example would be to study whether efforts to humanize the
relationships between custody officers and inmates would have a positive impact
upon rehabilitation and recidivism rates. There is reason to think that reducing
dehumanization of inmates would lead to greater personal engagement between
custody officers and inmates, and that, in turn, is likely to lead to better
rehabilitation and lower recidivism rates. At the November 2014 symposium,
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Secretary Jeffrey a.
Beard described new programs designed to improve an inmates’ changes for
reintegrating into society upon release; a special program focused on
rehumanization should perhaps be part of the effort.
III. THE ROLE OF DEHUMANIZATION IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
In addition to work by psychologists, there are a few pieces of legal
scholarship that have started to explore the role that the concept of
dehumanization might play in the proper interpretation of the Eighth
24
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.
The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has always included
language that connects to the concept of dehumanization, although that has not
always been the centerpiece of the Court’s reasoning or holding in particular
25
26
27
cases. From Weems v. United States and Trop v. Dulles, to Estelle v.
22. Id. at 133.
23. See id. at 135.
24. See Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to
Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111 (2007).
25. Id. at 115; Vasiljevic & Viki, supra note 14 at 133.
26. 217 U.S. 349, 368–77 (1910) (holding that a fine and fifteen year prison sentence for “falsifying a
single item of a public document” is cruel and unusual punishment).
27. 356 U.S. 86, 99–103 (1958) (holding that “use of denationalization as a [criminal] punishment” is
cruel and unusual because it is “a form of punishment more primitive than torture” that “strips the citizen of his
status in the national and international political community”).
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28

29

Gamble, and through to Brown v. Plata, the Court has recognized that, at its
core, the Eighth Amendment protects the human dignity of inmates.
When Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court in Plata, he framed the primary
issue in terms of fundamental human dignity. He wrote as follows:
As a consequence of their own actions, prisoners may be deprived of
rights that are fundamental to liberty. Yet the law and the Constitution
demand recognition of certain other rights. Prisoners retain the essence
of human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity
animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. “‘The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man.’” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
311 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality
opinion)).
. . . A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including
adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human
30
dignity and has no place in civilized society.
This language is the counterpart to the pictures of overcrowding attached to
the Court’s opinion, which illustrated the conditions.
There is, among some scholars, commentators, and pundits, a tendency to
skip over this type of lofty language in Supreme Court opinions as unimportant
rhetoric or literary license. So for some, the decision by the Court in Plata was
simply that the PLRA did not prevent a three-judge panel from setting a
population density limitation on a prison in truly extraordinary circumstances,
and that the evidence supported the 137.5% cap imposed by the three-judge
panel, where that figure could later be adjusted upon a proper showing of
changed circumstances. Under that reading, the state’s legal obligation is
satisfied simply by hitting the 137.5% target, and when that is done, the case is
over, and the State can move on.
I think that type of narrow reading misses the spirit of the Court’s holding
and the lesson it tries to teach. It may be a correct interpretation of the holding
insofar as prison overcrowding is concerned. But I think the importance of the
Plata decision—and its true lesson—lies in the Court’s insight that inmates must
be treated with the basic respect accorded to all persons by virtue of their

28. 429 U.S. 97, 101–06 (1976) (”[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
29. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011) (holding that a “court-mandated [prison] population limit [was]
necessary to remedy the violation of prisoner’ constitutional rights” where overcrowding caused the “severe and
unlawful mistreatment of prisoners through grossly inadequate provision of medical and mental health care”).
30. Id. at 1928 (parallel citations omitted).
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31

personhood. Inmates cannot be cast out of society, stripped of their moral
essence, and treated as savage animals.
What are the possible implications of taking the Court’s human dignity
language seriously, as I do? In terms of prison operations, there are lots of
possible implications. Let me give a couple of specific examples.
First, we had a bad death this last year where an inmate with a history of
32
tracheostomy and tracheal stenosis had been placed on suicide watch in an acute
mental health crisis bed. A complicated series of events contributed to his
possibly preventable death. On the evening of his death, he harmed himself by
placing food and feces in his tracheostomy, discarding the tracheostomy
appliance, and self traumatizing his trachea. Custody officers used pepper spray
on the patient without first checking with medical staff, and then refused to
extract the patient for decontamination and assessment of airway adequacy,
despite a medical order to do so, citing a danger of assaultive behavior. He
continued to be observed by nursing staff at regular intervals, but several hours
later was noted to be unresponsive in his cell. Although an attempt was made at
resuscitation, the attempt was unsuccessful. An autopsy concluded the patient
had died of asphyxiation from foreign material and blood in his airway.
Now my guess is that if the custody officers in charge of this situation
thought of this inmate as a fully morally valued person, there would have been a
very different result. But that is not the current culture in California’s prisons.
Let me turn to a broader example that I’ve already mentioned once before.
Let’s think about the relationship between custody officers and inmates. In most
California prisons today, there really isn’t much of a personal relationship
between officers and inmates. In many prison yards, you see inmates gathering
amongst themselves in the middle of the yard, and custody officers line up
against walls surrounding the yard. There is little intermingling of officers and
inmates. Officers are simply monitoring inmates, like visitors watching the
animals at the zoo, waiting to see if some violence or other misbehavior erupts
that requires intervention.
If we were serious about treating inmates as human beings, you can imagine
custody officers actually interacting with inmates throughout the yard on a
regular basis.
Now I am informed by my custody staff, who have served for thirty-plus
years in corrections, that custody officers in California prisons used to behave the

31. Id.
32. A “[t]racheostomy is an operative procedure that creates a surgical airway in the cervical trachea. It is
most often performed in patients who have had difficulty weaning off a ventilator, followed by those who have
suffered trauma or a catastrophic neurological insult.” Jonathan Lindman, Tracheostomy, MEDSCAPE (last
updated Jan. 21, 2015), http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/865068-overview (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review). Tracheal stenosis is a narrowing of the trachea. Salomon Waizel-Haiat, Tracheal Stenosis
Imaging, MEDSCAPE (last updated Nov. 7, 2013), http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/362175-overview (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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way I have just described. They were engaged with inmates. They knew the
inmates as people.
Academic research supports the view that this type of engagement is not only
33
good for inmates and custody officers, but tends to reduce recidivism. But this
type of engagement will be hard to sustain unless we can do something about the
culture of inmate dehumanization.
Turning to sentencing policy, I think there can be no question that the
language of dehumanization has been part and parcel of the get-tough-on-crime
policies of the last thirty years. With all felons dehumanized and demonized, any
notions of proportionality in sentencing become lost amid the rhetoric of locking
up the animals for as long as possible.
Over the last decade around the country, and more recently here in
California, the public rhetoric about criminals and punishment has become more
nuanced and sophisticated. The days when all felons could be painted with the
broad brush of murderers, rapists, and child molesters, has hopefully faded into
history. There is a greater recognition that not all criminals are equally dangerous
to society, and that it is possible to see a substantial reduction in prison
populations while also seeing a substantial reduction in crime.
One of the great fears I had in watching the implementation of Governor
Brown’s courageous realignment program was that we would have one or two
really bad results—a realigned prisoner who would commit some heinous
murder—that might turn the tide of public opinion against the program. So far,
that hasn’t happened.
Proposition 47 now goes a few steps further than realignment by re34
categorizing a number of felonies as misdemeanors. We’ll have to see over the
next several years whether Proposition 47 is equally successful.
With luck, we have entered a period in California where the rhetoric of
sentencing has largely turned away from dehumanization of all criminals to a
more thoughtful approach. Does that get us to a sentencing commission? I’m not
sure. The policy and political challenges of successfully advancing a sentencing
35
commission through the legislative process are significant. So I’m not going to
hazard a prediction on that topic. I know that it would require extraordinary
leadership to make it happen, and Governor Brown has already several times
demonstrated his extraordinary capacity for leadership. At a minimum, I think we
need to give the idea some time to come together.

33. See D.A. Andrews & Jerry J. Keissling, Program Structure and Effective Correctional Practices: A
Summary of the CaVic Research, in EFFECTIVE CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT 441, 462 (Robert R. Ross & Paul
Gendreau eds., 1980); Tony Ward & Mark Brown, The Good Lives Model and Conceptual Issues in Offender
Rehabilitation, 10 PSYCHOL., CRIME, & L. 243 (2004).
34 . STATE OF CAL., TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS 71, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/
general/pdf/text-of-proposed-laws1.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
35. W. David Ball, Redesigning Sentencing, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. -- (2014).
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Let me suggest one final area where taking the Court’s human dignity
language seriously may have an important consequence. As we all know,
California’s death penalty is broken; in my judgment, irretrievably broken.
Fifteen years ago, I worked with Governor Wilson’s office, Attorney General
Dan Lungren’s office, and the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court to
try to streamline certain elements of the death penalty process and to increase the
number of attorneys willing to take on the very difficult task of representing
death row defendants before the California Supreme Court. At that time, as I
36
recall, there were around 550 inmates on death row. Well, we were so
successful in our efforts, that now there are approximately 750 inmates on death
37
row.
Even if we were to start executing one inmate every two weeks, it would take
us twenty-nine years to clear death row, and that assumes zero new death penalty
judgments for the entire twenty-nine year period. And those 750 inmates cost the
State of California an enormous amount of additional money to house, care for,
and provide lawyers for. Is there any rational person anywhere who believes we
can fix the current system?
As most of you are aware, in July 2014, Federal District Judge Cormac
Carney held that California’s death penalty system was so dysfunctional and
riddled with so much delay and arbitrariness, that it constituted cruel and unusual
punishment to subject a convict sentenced to die in 1995 with the continuing but
38
remote threat of execution. I would add to his rationale that the death penalty is
the ultimate act of dehumanization. As the character portrayed by Clint Eastwood
in the movie Unforgiven famously said, “It’s a hell of a thing; killin’ a man. You
39
take away all he’s got, and all he’s ever gonna have.” Now I don’t know
40
whether Judge Carney’s opinion will hold up on appeal. I hope it does. But if it
doesn’t, I hope we can then have a serious conversation among the State’s
leaders and with the people of California about the inhumanity of our death
penalty system, its expense, and its permanent dysfunction. Perhaps some good
can come out of that conversation.

36. See Capital Punishment 2000, POLICY ALMANAC, http://www.policyalmanac.org/crime/archive/bjs_
capital_punishment.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2015) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that in
2000, California had 586 prisoners on death row).
37. See Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (stating that as of October 1, 2014, the number of death row inmates in California was 745).
38. Order Declaring California’s Death Penalty System Unconstitutional and Vacating Petitioner’s Death
Sentence at 28–29, Jones v. Chappell, Case No. CV 09–02158–CJC (C.D. Cal. 2014) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
39. UNFORGIVEN (Malpaso Productions 1992).
40. See Maura Dolan, California AG Kamala Harris to Appeal Ruling Against Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES
(Aug. 21, 2014, 2:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-death-penalty-appeal-20140821story.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that the ruling in Jones v. Chappell will be
appealed).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In closing, I hope my comments have at least raised in your minds some
legitimate questions that are worthy of further discussion, debate, and research.
Although I think much progress has been made in recent years in reforming
California’s corrections and sentencing policies, that progress may simply be a
swing in the pendulum. For these changes to become lasting and sustainable, I
believe we need to fundamentally alter our perception of criminals and inmates,
and recognize that treating them as dehumanized animals reflects poorly upon
our own moral compass.
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